People: Research Faculty
Morrow’s research addresses theories of international politics, both the logical development and empirical testing of such theories. He is best known for pioneering the application of noncooperative game theory, drawn from economics, to international politics. His published work covers crisis bargaining, the causes of war, military alliances, arms races, power transition theory, links between international trade and conflict, the role of international institutions, and domestic politics and foreign policy. Morrow’s current research addresses the role of selection institutions on domestic and foreign policy and the effects of norms on international politics. The latter project examines the laws of war in detail as an example of such norms.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., A. Smith, R.M. Siverson, J.D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003.
Morrow, J.D., Game Theory for Political Scientists. 1994: Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Morrow, J.D. When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, American Political Science Review, 101(2007):559-572
Morrow, J.D., Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances.American Journal of Political Science, 1991. 35(4): p. 904-933.
Morrow, J.D., Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.American Journal of Political Science, 1989. 33(4): p. 941-972.